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The classic mapping metaphor posits that children learn a word by mapping it onto a
concept of an object or event. However, we believe that a mapping metaphor cannot
account for word learning, because even though children focus attention on objects,
they do not necessarily remember the connection between the word and the referent
unless it is framed pragmatically, that is, within a task. Our theoretical paper proposes
an alternative mechanism for word learning. Our main premise is that word learning
occurs as children accomplish a goal in cooperation with a partner. We follow Bruner’s
(1983) idea and further specify pragmatic frames as the learning units that drive language
acquisition and cognitive development. These units consist of a sequence of actions
and verbal behaviors that are co-constructed with a partner to achieve a joint goal.
We elaborate on this alternative, offer some initial parametrizations of the concept, and
embed it in current language learning approaches.
Keywords: language acquisition, pragmatics, infants’ social learning, frames, learning and memory,
developmental robotics
INTRODUCTION
The direct mapping of words onto concepts has often been considered to be at the core of the
language acquisition mechanism. Indeed, it has been suggested that “in order to successfully
acquire a new word, young children must learn the correct associations between labels and their
referents” (Wojcik, 2013, p. 1). Children must first “attend to and encode information about the
referent,” and they have to learn “how the sounds in their language map onto objects, actions, and
other properties of the world” (Wojcik, 2013, p. 1). Studies investigating this mechanism assume
that once children are able to perceive a referent and to hear the word given to it, they will (1) link
the word with the referent and (2) remember it as a mapping. Then when they see the referent in
another situation, they will be able to recall the word; vice versa, when they hear the word, they will
be able to recall a memory of the object.
However, recent studies on language success in children from low-income families indicate
that the ability to refer a word to a referent might be only the last link in a long chain
that first starts with establishing more fundamental communicative skills that have been called
“communication foundations” (Bruner, 1983; Stephens and Matthews, 2014; Hirsh-Pasek et al.,
2015, p. 2). Nonetheless, many questions regarding the nature of these communication foundations
remain open. We believe that improving our understanding of these foundations will advance an
alternative explanation of how children acquire language in a social interaction.
Although there are certainly plenty of situations in children’s everyday lives in which a novel
word is taught to them by depicting and labeling a novel object, we suggest that this is not how
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word learning starts. Children learn the word “binky” not because
it is a novel word introduced to them before its use, but because it
is a word for an object that is used in the context of such activities
as soothing that involve not only the child but also other persons.
Importantly, the main purpose of these activities is not to acquire
a new word but to achieve a joint action goal (Lock, 1978; Bruner,
1983). Hence, children will pick up this word because it is being
used for a particular purpose that is relevant to them, and because
it is uttered hundreds of times to express activities in which it
is involved. Consequently, action and language are interwoven
right from the start (Lock, 1978). Moreover, this interaction is
organized systematically (e.g., Nomikou and Rohlfing, 2011) and
constrained by culture (Shotter and Newson, 1982; Bruner, 1983;
Nelson, 2007).
We think that one way to grasp this organization of language
and action is via the concept of pragmatic frames. A pragmatic
frame is a negotiated interaction protocol targeted to achieve
a joint goal that involves (1) a surface layer, namely, an
observable coordinated sequence of pragmatic behaviors in the
form of words and actions, (2) a deep structure underlying
these behaviors that targets the achievement of one or several
joint goals, and (3) a nested cognitive layer that specifies which
cognitive operations the frame triggers as it unfolds. We propose
that pragmatic frames serve as a communicative foundation or
a learning “matrix” (Bruner, 1983, p. 38) that emerges between
interactants, and that they are the key to understanding ecological
learning processes (see Figure 1)
Our proposed alternative to mapping in the form of pragmatic
frames is not new and conforms to existing ideas in language
acquisition research. However, in this article, we bundle these
ideas together, offer new concrete parameterizations that can be
used in models of social learning (see Pragmatic Frames—an
Introduction and History), and link these ideas more tightly to
the current debate on key aspects of word learning (see How
Current Approaches Interface with Pragmatic Frames). We hope
that our view – though certainly not yet fully developed – can
motivate research in language acquisition to study not only
individual words but also the emerging action sequences within
which these words are crucial for attaining joint goals. We also
hope that this theoretical perspective can inspire development
in human–robot/(–computer)–interaction, enabling machines to
use pragmatic frames and thus to learn and negotiate new
interaction structures by themselves.
PRAGMATIC FRAMES—AN
INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY
What we call pragmatic frames are also known as “interactional
formats” (Bruner, 1983, p. 120) or “frames” (Fillmore, 1982,
p. 111; Tomasello, 2003, p. 25). Pragmatic frames can be
understood as recurrent interactional structures (Bruner, 1983;
Ninio and Snow, 1996; Fogel and Garvey, 2007) that emerge over
time (see Pragmatic Frames Require a History of an Interaction).
In infant development, these structures first occur in a very
specific context (Bateson, 1955; Goffman, 1974; Kendon, 1985;
Rohlfing et al., 2015). They involve a sequence of goal-oriented
actions that is coordinated with the interaction partner (see
Pragmatic Frames Involve Goal-Oriented Actions and Table 1 for
more examples). Take, for example, a guessing game in which a
child is asked where the lamp is, and she or he points to it. When
performing this speech act, a competent speaker knows that the
goal has to be framed by a sequence of actions on the surface layer
(1) such as looking at the listener and asking a question with a
specific prosody and syntax that contains a slot for the requested
object. The deep structure (2) involves expecting the listener to
manipulate attention (e.g., by a pointing gesture) to make it joint.
The cognitive layer (3), in turn, entails the cognitive function for
the listener of identifying the requested object.
Pragmatic frames are retrieved from memory to guide the
interpretation of an ongoing situation (see Fillmore, 1982;
Bruner, 1983; Tomasello, 2003). Wittgenstein (1953/1997) called
such protocols or scripts in which action and language are
interwoven “language games [Sprachspiele].” They result in a
behavioral disposition within interactants that enables mutual
understanding. Language games follow regularities that are
constrained by different contexts. Without such regularities, it is
not possible for a word to have a meaning.
Steels (2001) modeled language games formally in
computational and robotic simulations of the formation of
linguistic conventions in groups of agents (Steels and Belpaeme,
2005). In these models, and in particularly in the Talking
Head experiment (Steels and Kaplan, 2002), language games
allowed robotic agents to successfully negotiate new semantic
representations in which words were used as cues to draw the
attention of social peers to a shared referent. In such models,
language acquisition goes far beyond the mapping mechanism
and fits within the pragmatic frame approach we propose here.
FIGURE 1 | Pragmatic frames involve operations on the cognitive level as well as on the pragmatic or communicative level (together, they constitute
the “meaning”). On the cognitive level, we distinguish between (1) perceptual functions and (2) functions pertaining to the representational organization of
knowledge. Perceptual functions include low-level processing such as segmentation and classification whereas functions pertaining to the representational
organization of knowledge include instantiating a new knowledge item, retrieving or correcting an existing knowledge item. The pragmatic level includes knowledge
about the interactional requirement and the pragmatic role of the participants, e.g., that a question is followed by an answer. Interactional experience (history of
interaction) is the driving force for deep meaning and deep syntax as constituents of an invariant structure.
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TABLE 1 | Examples of pragmatic frames.
Guessing game (Steels, 2001):
Speaker Listener
(1) By pointing, eye gazing or other means, the speaker draws the listener’s
visual attention toward an object of interest.
(2) The listener attends to the object
(3) The speaker shares a single predicate that is true for the object of interest
but not for the other objects in this context.
(4) The listener shares the predicate and looks up all associations with this
predicate in her memory.
(5) The listener applies the highest scoring association and points to the
object of interest.
(6) The speaker gives feedback.
Greeting (in which a child learns the name of another person):
Caregiver Child Greeted person
(1) The person recognizes somebody familiar and shares this
with the child “Look, there is Anna! Let’s say hello to her!
(2) Both are approaching the other person or making them visible.
(3) The person looks at the other person says “hello!” and/or
waves.
(4) The person looks up and recognizes a familiar
person.
(5) The listener says “Hello!” to the caregiver and
the child or caregiver waves.
(6) Both acknowledge it by smiling.
Story telling (Quasthoff, 1997):
Story teller Listener
[(1) Can ask about an event]
(1) Display of referential relevance Display of formal relevance
(Can ask questions)
(2) Topicalization
(3) Elaboration
(4) Closing
(5) Translation/Evaluation
(6) Evaluation
Action demonstrations (HRI – Akgun et al., 2012):
Experimenter/Programmer Teaching user Robot learner
(1) Start (2) “New demonstration.”
(3) The user moves the arms of the robot and records poses as
keyframe with the command “Record frame.”
(4) “End of demonstration.”
(5) The user can ask the robot to perform the learned movement
with the command “Can you perform the skill?”
(6) The robot performs the
movement.
(7) End
However, both Wittgenstein as well as Steels and colleagues
barely considered the details of the cognitive and developmental
dimensions involved in learning these frames.
Schank and Abelson (1977) have addressed cognitive
dimensions and emphasized the fact that our interactional
knowledge is organized into sequences of actions and linguistic
acts. Importantly, this knowledge involves extractions of events
“connected directly to the goals and plans to realize those goals
made by the participants” (Schank and Abelson, 1977, p. 156).
Fillmore (1982) has shown that these extractions comprise
semantic roles to evoke the same aspects of a scene in different
ways. This knowledge is then used to interpret situations
(Fillmore, 1982; see Pragmatic Frames Evoke an Interpretation
of a Situation).
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A reflection of this frame structure can be found on the
linguistic surface in the approach known as Construction
Grammar (e.g., Goldberg, 2003). Constructions that relate
syntactic structure to meaning are acquired through “repeated
exposure to the usage of language in context” (Fischer, 2015,
p. 563). Central to this view is, once again, the use of syntactical
units that occur in concrete events and then become abstracted.
Several computational models, such as Spranger (2011) and
Spranger et al.’s (2012) Fluid Construction Grammar, have
begun to shed light on how semantic roles evolve and can be
negotiated; how particular syntactical units become attached to
cognitive operations; or how these links becomes routinized and
abstracted through repeated usage (see the usage-based models
in, e.g., Langacker, 1987; Behrens, 2009). However, Construction
Grammar applies mainly to understanding and acquisition in the
context of linguistic interaction. As a result, such frames have
hardly ever been included and developed within more general
forms of social interaction such as joint actions (but see Dominey
and Boucher, 2005).
What interests us is not just the fact that usage-based models
allow Construction Grammar to accommodate dynamic aspects
of language such as acquisition and change (Croft, 2007). For our
approach to what we call the communicative foundation, it is the
social-pragmatic aspects of language that are more crucial and
the way they preserve a tight link to actions (Harris et al., 1988;
Barrett et al., 1991; Tomasello, 2003; Nelson, 2007). By extending
the units of syntax to gestures, the concept of pragmatic frames
can also be used to refer to the infants’ multimodal ability to
enter “into some type of joint attentional focus with a mature
language user” (Tomasello and Akhtar, 1995, p. 201). Bruner
(1983) describes the value of joint attention extensively, and he
ascribes the origins of semantics to the deictic acts of showing
and following (e.g., pointing). Tomasello et al. (2005, p. 682)
capitalized on this potential of deictic acts revealing that starting
from 9 months of age, the child’s ability “to actually share goals”
becomes visible when she or he points to, for example, an object:
an infant uses pointing gestures, because they are a means to
engage the attention of others. Although we think that the ability
to engage in joint attention is certainly an important milestone in
communication and is achieved not only via gaze and pointing
but also via eye–hand coordination (Yu and Smith, 2013)
and non-visual modalities (Akhtar and Gernsbacher, 2007), we
suggest that joint attention is often a means toward reaching the
joint goal (as an element required within a sequence of actions,
as noted by Shotter and Newson, 1982) rather than being the
purpose of an interaction: Communication with children does
not stop at the coordination of attention.
Most recent approaches taking the perspective of a social-
pragmatic theory of language acquisition focus on the role of
social cues. These may be, for example, an eye gaze, a pointing
gesture, or a smile. All such cues are supposed to be especially
meaningful to young infants (e.g., Szufnarowska et al., 2014) who
exhibit a particular responsivity to them (Gergely and Watson,
1999; Senju and Csibra, 2008; Csibra and Gergely, 2009; Csibra,
2010). Whereas some researchers claim that this responsivity
belongs to their innate disposition (Csibra, 2010), others provide
examples of how this disposition might be educated and emerge
over time (Nomikou et al., 2013; Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi et al.,
2013; Rohlfing and Nomikou, 2014). At this point, we wish to
emphasize the difference between the concept of a “cue” and the
interactive process of a “co-construction”: whereas a cue would
trigger a desired behavior in merely one short moment, a co-
construction takes time and requires many turns in a process
of mutual adjustment (Fogel, 1993; De Jaegher et al., 2010;
Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi et al., 2014). It is only as a consequence
of this mutual adjustment – within which interactants have to
exchange behaviors in order to agree on the joint goal (see
Dynamic Coupling) – that a behavior eventually becomes a cue.
A cue is supposed to direct attention toward a referent (which,
in turn, can initiate a mapping). We will argue below that the
establishment of a cue is driven by repeatedly occurring joint
action sequences.
Whereas the concept of a frame is reduced mostly to particular
early games (Bruner, 1983) and social cues in developmental
studies, some further specifications can be found in modeling
work. Steels (2001) and Steels and Kaplan (2002) (see also
Table 1) have experimented with various preprogrammed
interaction protocols designed specifically to allow robots to learn
speech elements (Oudeyer, 2006), lexicons (Steels and Kaplan,
2002), or grammatical structures (Steels and Spranger, 2008).
Related work has used similar interactional frames to allow a
structured interaction between humans and robots. This has
enabled robot learners to identify and learn new elements of
language (Roy and Pentland, 2002; Cangelosi and Riga, 2006;
Lyon et al., 2012). Work on human–robot interaction has shown
that structured interaction protocols based on, for example,
mechanisms of imitation or conditioning (Billard et al., 2008;
Cuayáhuitl, 2015) allowed users to teach novel sensorimotor skills
to robots. However, as we discuss in Vollmer et al. (submitted),
the flexibility and power of social learning mechanisms is severely
limited. In these existing models (1) the interaction protocols
were preprogrammed (i.e., the robot knew how to use and
understand them); (2) only few interaction protocols were used
at the same time; and (3) they did not include mechanisms to
learn and negotiate new interaction protocols. Overcoming these
limitations will certainly result in new possibilities of interacting
with artificial systems.
Although by allowing rich and varied interaction, protocols
may, at first sight, appear to complexify the learning process,
the information contained in variable parts of these protocols
may actually be the key to cueing the inference process and
enabling goal-oriented learning of novel actions in much larger
dimensional representation spaces. In the following, we specify
the key characteristics of pragmatic frames.
Pragmatic Frames Require a History of
an Interaction
Repetition is central to the power of pragmatic frames. First,
the division of roles and tasks is important to co-construct a
goal-oriented sequence of social actions. Through the ability to
remember a sequence of events (Davachi and DuBrow, 2015), its
repeated occurrence enables participants to develop expectations
regarding how actions relate to each other (Marcos, 1991;
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Nomikou et al., 2016, accepted). Repeating a particular situation
leads to a familiarization effect. A familiarization results in (1)
easily interpretable settings, and (2) lower cognitive load (Bruner,
1983). In the following, we explain these two strongly related
effects in more detail.
In their first and second years of life, children learn primarily
on the basis of familiar elements in the context, and they need
environmental or social support to produce the appropriate
behavior. Some studies have shown that elements of an ongoing
situation give rise to cognitive operations in infants. Recently, for
example, Parise and Csibra (2013) showed that children exhibited
an N-400 semantic priming effect only when they heard their
mothers voicing words referring to a visual stimulus presentation.
With respect to children’s non-verbal behavior, Beisert et al.
(2012) found that facing an unusual situation hindered imitation
ability in 14-month-olds.
Marcos (1991) has cast light on the process of social support
in repeating contexts and its value for language acquisition. In
this study, mothers described a poster repeatedly to their 12- to
13-month-old children. Results showed that in comparison to
controls, infants in the repeating context condition showed an
increase in (1) the time devoted to referential behavior, (2) the
number of infant initiations of dialog, and (3) the use of pointing
gestures.
Farrar et al. (1993) examined the value of the familiarity
of situational aspects for processing capabilities by observing
mothers and their 2-year-old children playing with toys in either
a familiar setting (same toys in all sessions) or an unfamiliar
setting (new toys in each session). Comparing children’s word
productions across settings revealed that children used more
different lexical types, used more verbs, and had a higher mean
length of utterance in the familiar toy setting. Farrar et al. (1993,
p. 603) suggested that the familiarity with the toys provided
both “a conceptual framework for interpreting the event” and an
increase in “processing space.” In this sense, a familiar situation
cues the retrieval of the appropriate meaning, because highly
frequent items form stronger associative networks than less
familiar sets (cf. Bjorklund, 1987). In another study, Rohlfing
(2006) investigated the acquisition of spatial prepositions in
2-year-olds by presenting them with sets of toys that were
either familiar or unfamiliar. Results showed the best learning
with familiar sets. Furthermore, familiarity not only seems to
support the interpretation of an ongoing situation, but may also
be a prerequisite for the extension process by which children
generalize their knowledge to novel situations. Without the ability
to apply what they have learned in a familiar situation, children
would be unable to generalize a spatial preposition to novel
objects. This seems to indicate a hierarchical structure of learning
proceeding from a familiar context to the ability to generalize
(Rohlfing, 2006).
Taken together, this evidence suggests that the familiarity of
a situation influences the perception of the overall interaction
setting and the required degree of effort. When interpreting a
situation, children need to hook up with familiar elements.
Currently, we do not know on which basis children are able
to recognize a repeated situation, thereby enabling them to
anticipate actions (Schacter et al., 2007; Ramscar et al., 2010).
The ability to recognize sequences of events certainly plays
a key role. In fact, in recent neurophysiological approaches,
Davachi and DuBrow (2015) showed how sequences elicited
hippocampal patterns that stabilized through repetition. They
suggested that this “may be a distinction between single-trial or
episodic sequence encoding and the representation of a well-
learned, repeated, predictable sequence because each re-exposure
to a sequence may modify the learned representation” (p. 2). This
distinction also needs to be studied in developmental research.
Although the comparison of learning situations is already
recognized as a powerful mechanism (Yu and Smith, 2007;
Trueswell et al., 2013), its use has been limited to investigations
across trials or to fixed delays (e.g., Vlach, 2014). We need to fill
this research gap and explain the process of dynamic integration
between learned regularities and the immediate contextual cues
guiding attention at the specific moment (Smith et al., 2010)
that yields “attentional hierarchies” (Bahrick and Newell, 2008,
p. 993).
Pragmatic Frames Involve Goal-Oriented
Actions
Bruner (1983, pp. 24–31) acknowledges that children are
equipped with some predispositions that help them to make
sense of recurrent situations. He calls this the “initial cognitive
endowment.” One proposed prerequisite is that children transfer
experiences into means–goal structures (p. 18). This endowment
supplies some semantic targets (p. 34). Similarly, Nelson (1974)
proposes that actions and their results are at the core of children’s
concepts (see also Mandler, 2012). In fact, in their early infancy,
humans are “obsessed” with goals. Csibra and Gergely (2007)
propose two main epistemic functions that this obsession serves:
online prediction (see below) and social learning.
Online prediction encompasses the fact that infants look at
(Baldwin et al., 2001), imitate (Meltzoff, 1995), and anticipate
(Woodward, 1999; Falck-Ytter et al., 2006) others’ action goals
rather than regarding other aspects of observed behaviors.
Several researchers assume that the basis for this is the way the
infant’s own motor system develops while gathering own motor
experiences (Woodward, 2009; Kanakogi and Itakura, 2011).
Thus, when observing someone performing an action, children
will simulate an action plan covertly (Rizzolatti et al., 2001) if this
plan is already in their action repertoire (Woodward, 1999).
Csibra and Gergely (2007), in turn, offer an alternative
approach to action understanding in which situational
constraints are relevant. “Teleological reasoning [. . .] requires
the recruitment of the relevant background knowledge that
the observer accumulated about the physical constraints of the
situation and of the actor” (Csibra and Gergely, 2007, p. 70). This
argument is supported by the fact that infants attribute goals not
only to conspecifics but also to abstract and artificial agents.
Yet another source that might serve as a database for infants
to recognize a structure in the relation between an involved
agent and her or his goal is the interaction (Reddy and Uithol,
2015; Nomikou et al., 2016, accepted). Even though Gerson and
Woodward (2014) have argued recently for a “unique effect of
active over observational experience” on the recognition of goal
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structures in actions, this effect might appear only because of
the dichotomy between active and observational experience.
But what about an experience in which an infant is only a part
of an action? Reddy et al. (2013; see also Lock, 1978) have
shown impressively that 2-month-old infants already perform
anticipatory adjustments of their own body when they see a
caregiver approaching to pick them up. Clearly, infants learn very
early on in their development that one of the most important
means to achieve their own goals is the actions of their caregiver.
Simultaneously, they experience their own actions in the light
of goals as interpreted by their caregivers: Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi
et al. (2013) have shown that seemingly random movements of
3-month-olds will be interpreted as some form of collaboration
and weaved into a joint activity. It should be noted that the notion
of goals, and especially how goals are represented, is currently
underspecified in the scientific debate (Wrede et al., 2012). More
specifically, little is known about bottom–up ways for learners
to infer or detect the (potential) goal of an action. Wrede et al.
(2012) argue, however, that it is reasonable to assume bottom-up
biases that exist and predispose the learner to identify goal-
relevant features. The relevant definition of a goal should also
encompass the social dimension. Little is known, for example,
about the role of emotional attunement in goal recognition,
although it has been recognized as being crucial in infant
development (Legerstee, 2005; see also Stephens and Matthews,
2014, for a brief review). Combining emotions with action goals,
Rossmanith et al. (2014, p. 8) have proposed that “action arcs”
shape activities with children. These are built up within the flow
of the interaction and thus consist of a beginning, a building up,
a climax, and a resolution. The term “climax” is similar to our
conception of the joint goal but pinpoints the emotional function
that sequentially organized actions have to fulfill.
Social Learning
Children experience goals by being active, by being a part of
a collaborative activity, and by being interpreted as active. In
fact, the goal of a joint interaction is central to the idea of
the pragmatic frame studied in this article. We conform with
Tomasello et al. (2005, p. 676) in believing that “human beings
[. . .] are biologically adapted for participating in collaborative
activities involving shared goals and socially coordinated action
plans.” With growing interactional experience, children become
able to elicit goals on their own. However, we hypothesize that
they start with ideas of goals that differ significantly from the
goals pursued by older children or adults. In this sense, inducing
a significant change in the environment such as turning the light
on and off might well be an attractive goal for a young child
(Wrede et al., 2012). Such goals are commonly used in the first
steps of language acquisition: Stern and Stern (1975) reported
a first understanding in their child following an instruction to
change the environment in a significant acoustic way by, for
example, ringing a bell or clapping hands. Nelson (1974, p. 279)
also remarks that early vocabularies include objects that “move or
change in some way or that child can act upon” so that the goal of
the activities is perceivable.
This vision of how the acquisition of new words can occur as a
side effect of interaction games leading toward joint actions leads
us to disagree with Tomasello’s (2001) suggestion that language
acquisition is possible only when children develop the skill of
joint attention. We think that joint attention is helpful—and,
as a frame, it massively boosts word learning. However, we
think that children gain a rich interactional experience in
expecting and coordinating actions that is crucial for language
learning from other frames consisting of goal-directed actions
in a sequence in which roles have to be fulfilled and children’s
attention is educated in the sense of fulfilling this role (not
necessarily visually). The goals of these actions are crucial for
their organization, and we locate these on the deep structure
level (see below). Our view is supported by Mastin and Vogt’s
(2015) comparison between urban and rural communities in
Mozambique. They found that language is unlikely to occur
during joint attention with objects in a non-industrial rural
environment in which object stimulation is not common. Instead,
the vocabulary scores of children raised in this environment
correlated positively with dyadic activities engaged in through
touch and ritualized play. Here, further cross-cultural studies
are necessary to reveal alternative interaction protocols. Along
these lines, Nelson (2007, p. 118) suggests that even in societies
in which parents do not engage in naming things, “immersion
in a language-using community” contributes to patterns of
interaction. These patterns are pragmatic frames that enable
children’s learning.
Pragmatic Frames Consist of a Meaning
and a Syntax
Bruner (1983, p. 46) points out that pragmatic frames can be
characterized by a surface and a deep structure: he uses deep
structure to characterize the invariant basic form of a pragmatic
frame and surface structure to characterize its appearance (i.e.,
the variable forms in which the deep structure is realized). For
Bruner’s (1983) famous example of the peek-a-boo game, the
deep structure is about hiding and reappearing, whereas the
means for it can vary on the surface structure.
We prefer to account for pragmatic frames by using the terms
meaning and syntax. This allows us to further differentiate the
structure introduced by Bruner (1983) (see Table 2). Another
crucial difference is our inclusion of cognitive operations among
the ingredients of meaningful behavior that are needed for an
appropriate coordination and disposition of the participants.
Meaning: Connection to the Cognitive Processes
We call the set of effects that a frame has on memory
processes (i.e., the cognitive functions involved in the frame)
the meaning of a pragmatic frame. Whereas, of course, memory
effects are present for both interaction partners (see Figure 1),
we focus on the learner side. In line with Bruner’s (1983)
surface and deep structure, we differentiate the surface from
the deep meaning of a pragmatic frame. The surface meaning
denotes the set of cognitive operations associated with the
pragmatic frame. We presume that these emerge with a child’s
growing interactional experience. For example, Nomikou et al.
(2013) showed that mothers use sensitivities toward motion and
intermodal synchrony to educate their infant’s gaze behavior,
and that this develops into a convention. As an effect, gazing at
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TABLE 2 | Our concrete parameterizations of pragmatic frames.
Syntax Meaning
Surface – External
– Directly observable
– Sequence of behaviors
– Execution of deep syntax
– Hidden
– Cognitive operations recruited
from memory
– Emerging cues of behavior
Deep – Invariant properties inferred
from, e.g., statistical learning
– The basis for a sequence
– Specifies slot and type of
learning content
– Hidden
– Constructed around joint
goal(s)
– Cognitive operations in a
sequence for a (joint) goal
– Long-term effects on memory
– Specification of learning
content possible because it is
embedded in familiar
goal-directed sequence of
actions
the interaction partner communicates a referential expectation
(Senju and Csibra, 2008; Szufnarowska et al., 2014). The surface
meaning consists of such conventionalized signals; that is,
individual elements of behavioral patterns (pragmatic acts) that
are known to the learner from previous interactions, already
acquired pragmatic frames, or constituents of such. They can be
basic and automated in terms of being reactive behaviors, but
bear some dispositions that are co-constructed with the partner:
for example, when a tutor points to an object, the learner not only
follows the gesture but also expects a referent (Gliga and Csibra,
2009). These operations do not necessarily appear constantly, but
may vary to a similar degree as the constituents of the surface
structure. Take, for example, the way blind people perceive a new
object via touch or hearing (Bigelow, 2003). Although this way
will differ in the type of cognitive operations needed to process
the perception, it results in the same deep structure. The patterns
of the surface meaning thus create anticipation of the learning
content on the cognitive level.
We use the deep meaning of the pragmatic frame to
refer to the goal-directed cognitive operations involved in the
processing of, for example, its learning content. The deep
structure differs from the surface structure in that learners
will experience more interactions and more variability in the
performance of the behavioral sequence. As a consequence, they
will be able to extract the invariant regularities and generalize
the interaction structure. This extraction might be a kind of
embodied abstraction (Binder and Desai, 2011) from concrete
modality-specific memory to amodal memory. Although the
understanding of the generalization process is still nebulous, we
believe that it produces a kind of schema/construction (Nelson,
1974; Behrens, 2009; Binder and Desai, 2011). Constructions
make a slot available to users that can take different forms: a
non-verbal behavior within joint engagement (Nelson, 2007) or
creative verbal behavior (Lieven et al., 2003). That is, children
can expect a particular form of interaction (see also the deep
syntax for more details), because the deep syntax allows them
to tune into the content. For example, in a labeling frame, a
learner will expect that the utterance “this is a...” performed
with a pointing gesture toward an object is about associating
a word with this object. In this frame, the learner’s role is to
follow the gesture, extract a single object from the complex scene,
and memorize its label in order to recall it when the referent is
present. Thus, the learning slot affects memory but is linked to
the pragmatic role that the learner takes in this frame. In other
words, gaining a grasp of the deep meaning of pragmatic frames
is equivalent to knowing what the interaction is about (Lock,
1978).
Thus, cognitive skills are linked to pragmatic skills as an
important and innovative aspect of the pragmatic frames concept
proposed here (see Figure 1). With pragmatic skills, we refer to
children’s ability to contextualize their (verbal and non-verbal)
behavior for a specific purpose. We predict that training with
pragmatic frames should lead to an improvement in related
cognitive skills that can be assessed by testing slow mapping
abilities (in an interactive setting with an experimenter) and
language processing (in an eye-tracking setting). Thom and
Sandhofer (2009) have already provided some support for this
prediction by demonstrating that 20-month-old children learned
color words more robustly when exposed to more instances
during training. We assume that the training in this study
advanced the children’s ability to prioritize the colors of the
objects in their memories.
For the meaning of pragmatic frames in general, we
hypothesize that not all aspects within a frame will be learned
at once, but that learning will proceed from the surface level
(because recurring, directly observable patterns are easier to
identify) to the deep level and from the syntax level to the
underlying cognitive level. This indicates the need for different
attentional processes (i.e., from surface to cognitive level)
(Krauzlis et al., 2014). For example, turn taking is learned
very early in a child’s development (Kaye and Wells, 1980)
and enables a child to develop such cognitive operations as
eliciting, expecting, and waiting for somebody’s response. These
operations can be used on a surface level as a first encounter with
the meaning. Our hypothesis is that observations of productive
behavior (elements of the surface level) might be acquired
before an understanding of behavior (operations needed on
the cognitive level) in situations in which communication is
scripted and thus transparent. In fact, Salas Poblete (2011)
showed that in highly structured triadic situations in which they
could imitate a model, 2-year-old learners displayed a productive
communicative behavior (an appropriate gesture for a referent)
without grasping the underlying robust meaning of a pragmatic
frame that would allow them to transfer it to a new exemplar of
the referent.
Syntax of Pragmatic Frames
We will call the sequence of verbal and non-verbal actions that
characterize the appearance of a pragmatic frame its syntax. Like
Bruner (1983), we define the surface syntax as the observable
sequence of behaviors constituting the pragmatic frame. The
surface syntax comprises, amongst others, the adequate sensory
means, the possible orders of behavioral units, and information
about actors. Surface syntax also specifies the sequence of
cognitive actions. We assume that such cognitive operation
sequences need to be learned (and automatized). One example
of how a sequence can change the subsequent operations is given
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in Moll et al. (2006). In this study, children at the age of 14, 18,
and 24 months witnessed an adult expressing excitement while
looking to the side on which an object was located. In a condition
in which the object was new for the adult, children responded
by attending to the whole object. In a condition in which the
child and the adult had previously played with the object, children
responded by attending to a specific part of the object or by
expecting another object of interest to be present in the room.
Clearly, this behavior is not a part of the operations and roles
related to the common frame in which a learner encounters a new
object.
For word learning, deep syntax can specify the slot for the
(learning) content (i.e., where it is in the sequence) and the type of
content (e.g., whether a noun or a color is learned). The function
of deep syntax is twofold: first, it reflects the generalizability
of the interaction structure (because the invariant parameters
will be gathered across various experiences); second, it contains
information about the (learning) content and thus what the
sequence is about—this constitutes a link to the deep meaning
(see above).
Take the action of pointing to an object and labeling it.
Performing this act, a competent speaker knows that its goal has
to be framed by (1) looking at the other person, (2) pointing in
the direction of an object, and (3) uttering its label. The role of the
learner is then to recall this label in the presence of the referent.
When learning new words, this sequence will be repeated with
varying content in only some slots. Thus, the learning dimensions
within frames are limited to operations such as to identifying the
slot within a known frame and to processing the new information
in the slot leading to a knowledge update.
Crucially, the slot with the learning content (e.g., a new word)
works successfully only when the learner is able to apply the
content (e.g., a new word) appropriately (e.g., by choosing the
correct object from an array). Once cognitive operations are set
up in line with a collaborative behavior for a specific learning
task, the changing elements likely become easy to pick up. Note,
however, that the element will be picked up only because it
is crucial for the joint goal (e.g., the tutor expects the learner
to choose the correct object and to give it to the tutor). The
(learning) content, which is put into a particular slot, links the
deep syntax to the deep meaning.
For learning, the relevant content is given by the deep level
of both syntax and meaning. Whereas a pragmatic frame that
appears to be situated solely on the surface level does not seem
to contain a slot for learning in the explicit learning sense
(compared to, e.g., the frame of greeting someone), the learner
can prescind from this frame to create a slot for learning—
for example, whom to greet and whom not to greet. Clearly,
we need to specify which circumstances can push the learner
forward: Is it the tutor, the cross-situational comparisons, or the
negative examples? We presume that not only the deep meaning
but also the deep syntax are involved in the schematization
process (Behrens, 2009; Fischer, 2015) that results in abstract
representations. This idea is compatible with Nelson’s (1974)
suggestion that the functional core of a concept for individual
words becomes synthesized from concrete acts and their various
relationships. It is also compatible with Barrett et al. (1991)
multiroute model of early lexical development. They suggest
that context-bound words (initially mapped onto an event
representation) and social-pragmatic words might be learnt
differently from referential words such as nominals or non-
nominals (initially mapped onto a prototype). We think that
a frame of use for these words may well influence the kind
of representations that arise. A concrete examination of word
learning frames might help to verify this theoretical assumption.
Roy et al. (2015) have suggested that in order to acquire verbs
(in contrast to nouns), children might need the support of the
activities taking place in a particular space.
Different frames might result in different forms of
representations. Input can certainly help children to organize
their knowledge (Gelman, 2009) and to exercise cross-situational
comparisons (Gelman et al., 2005). In addition, the syntax of
a frame can vary to some extent from person to person. Thus,
children organize their conceptual knowledge on the basis of
private experience that is “different from the adult’s and from
the conventional meaning” (Nelson, 2007, p. 124). The form
of the parts that constitute the syntax varies according to the
utterances and tokens used (e.g., when uttering the label in the
pointing–labeling frame described above, possible tokens include
X [ = label], it’s an X, that’s an X, there’s an X [cf. Bruner, 1983,
p. 79], intonation, prosody, and pause lengths). Young infants,
however, are presented with a stable caregiver’s behavior on
which they can rely. Certainly, the syntax of a pragmatic frame is
highly conventionalized and “cannot be specified independently
of the perceptions of the participants” (Bruner, 1983, p. 133). We
assume that children need to experience a lot of variations on
the surface level to grasp the deep meaning. The role of variation
is compatible with what Clark (1993) proposes as the principles
of contrast and conventionality that guide children’s word
learning. We view pragmatic frames as interaction protocols
that eventually become conventionalized. And when words are
applied in different frames, these contrasts might advance their
schematization (see above).
Hierarchy of Pragmatic Frames
Currently, one of the major challenges in this alternative
approach is to determine how far formats may be modular;
that is, how far they may be composed to form bigger units or
recomposed to form other sequences. Can a pointing gesture to
an object already be a pragmatic frame? Or is it just a part of
it? Humans have the capacity to assemble a new structure from
previously experienced elements (Davachi and DuBrow, 2015).
Hence, it is likely that pragmatic frames can be created ad hoc
from known elements. Heller and Rohlfing (2015) found that
children as young as 13 months create new gestural practices
when narrating a picture. Yet, this novelty occurred in the
familiar context of joint book readings. For verbal behavior,
Lieven et al. (2003) showed how a 2-year-old child was able
to perform some operations (such as substitute, add-on) on
previously heard utterances.
Bruner (1983) recognizes that:
Formats are also modular in the sense of being accessible as
subroutines for incorporation in larger scale, long-term routines.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 8 April 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 470
fpsyg-07-00470 April 19, 2016 Time: 14:42 # 9
Rohlfing et al. Pragmatic Frames
A greeting format, for example, can be incorporated in a larger
scale routine involving other forms of joint action. In this sense,
any given format may have a hierarchical structure, parts being
interpretable in terms of their placement in a larger structure. The
creation of higher-order formats by incorporation of subroutine
formats is one of the principal sources of presupposition. What is
incorporated becomes implicit or presupposed (p. 133).
Along these lines, we agree with Bruner (1983) that:
Formats “grow” and can become as varied and complex as
necessary. Their growth is effected in several ways. They may
in time incorporate new means or strategies for the attainment
of goals, including symbolic or linguistic ones. They may move
toward coordination of the goals of the two partners not only
in the sense of “agreement,” but also with respect to a division
of a labor and a division of initiative. And they may become
conventionalized or canonical in fashion that permits others
within a symbolic community (e.g., a “speech community”) to
enter the format in a provisional way to learn its special rules (p.
132–133).
Nonetheless, the challenge is still to create a model that
can grow by (1) accepting new means for the effects, (2)
modulating goals, and (3) accepting new frames when they
become conventionalized, that is, a part of an interactional
routine.
Pragmatic Frames Evoke an
Interpretation of a Situation
To date, investigations of pragmatic frames have concentrated on
whether and at which age children master a particular routine.
For example, Franco and Butterworth (1996) have shown that
16-month-olds have already learned to visually check whether
their interlocutor is attentive before they point to something.
van der Goot et al. (2014) conducted a series of experiments
showing which conditions have to be fulfilled for infants to point
and what children expect their partners to do in a particular
context (Thorgrimsson et al., 2014, 2015). This research attests
to conventionality and children’s growing expectations that
communicative situations will conform to a particular structure.
Children expect a structure not only on a syntax level but also
on the level of meaning. Matthews et al. (2010) showed that
children usually expect only one label to refer to an object. They
broke these “referential pacts” (Matthews et al., 2010, p. 749) by
having different experimenters assign different labels to the same
objects. When responding to the new labeling, 3-year-olds were
slower, suggesting a greater cognitive load. Metzing and Brennan
(2003) found that children demonstrated social-cognitive abilities
unlike those of adults because they expected referential pacts to
persist across experimenters. Some children protested explicitly:
“While they understood that the alternative terms were intended
to refer to the same object, they were very keen to pass normative
judgment on term use and did not appear to fully appreciate that
different people might take different perspectives on an object”
(Matthews et al., 2010, p. 756).
In our opinion, previous experimental research has focused on
very specific pragmatic frames (mostly labeling) and described
their functions for a specific kind of learning. What is still
lacking, however, is a broader perspective that accounts for
other learning situations (Nakao and Andrews, 2014) and thus
other possible pragmatic frames. One interesting recent study
was conducted by Moore et al. (2013). They presented 3-
year-olds with a hiding game and showed that the children
could comprehend a novel communicative act even without
the means of communication on which they typically rely.
However, the children seemed “to exploit a number of everyday
bodily cues in interpreting communicative intent” (Moore et al.,
2013, p. 75). Thus, apparently, children are on the lookout for
familiar frames that may help them to interpret an ongoing
situation.
One of our studies (Salas Poblete, 2011; Rohlfing et al.,
2013) provides a first methodological approach for manipulating
pragmatic frames actively in the context of word learning in order
to explore their influence on learning success. Specifically, we
tested children’s word learning in known labeling frames and
in frames consisting of new elements. For the latter, the object
was highlighted by a light being switched on under it instead of
using the familiar pointing gesture. We found that children still
learned new words in unfamiliar frames (Salas Poblete, 2011),
suggesting that new elements might slow down but not eliminate
learning. This implies that young learners might be tolerant
toward changes in the elements of a frame. It remains unclear
whether some elements (e.g., ostension) can be interpreted more
strongly as a particular frame than others (e.g., pointing).
Many open questions arise from these considerations: If a
child needs to experience a situation repeatedly to accumulate
information about it, we need to know what aspects of a
situation are crucial for learning and whether children differ
in the way they construct a situation. Crucially, we should
look at the entire situation as constructed by individuals
and not at isolated aspects of it. The first step could be to
identify whether and how significant changes to the learning
situation impose a greater cognitive load on learners. Because the
interactive roles in a particular situation seem to be crucial for
establishing a pragmatic frame (Bruner, 1983), it is relevant to
investigate whether children’s perception of a situation changes
when they are able to reverse the roles (Carpenter et al.,
2005). In a next step, future research needs to explain how
a change of a frame can be detected. A solution is necessary
to account for the question regarding which factors indicate
that a new frame is initiated and, thus, to allow intelligent
systems to act flexibly within an interaction (Vollmer et al.,
submitted).
Asymmetric Pragmatic Frames:
Scaffolding
For language acquisition, it is important to consider the frames
that caregivers establish intuitively when eliciting and training
specific behavior in children. More specifically, a caregiver seems
to reduce “degrees of freedom in the task to manageable limits”
and to mark critical features (Wood et al., 1976, p. 99; see also
Pitsch et al., 2014). Bruner (1983) recognizes that:
One special property of formats involving an infant and an adult
[. . .] is that they are asymmetrical with respect to the knowledge
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of the partners—one ‘knows what’s up,’ the other does not know
or knows less. Insofar as the adult is willing to ‘hand over’ his
knowledge, he can serve in the format as model, scaffold, and
monitor until the child achieves requisite mastery. (p. 133)
Following the “interactive turn” in social cognition research
(De Jaegher et al., 2010; Cowley, 2011), recent studies have
revealed that an unfolding interaction provides the tutor with
an opportunity to adapt to the learner’s needs over time (e.g.,
Fukuyama et al., 2014; Pitsch et al., 2014). Continuing this line of
research, we propose that modifications by the more competent
partner offer the learner the possibility to join the interaction,
even though the learner might not understand every detail of
it (Wrede et al., 2013). Yet, we know little about how children
gain a grasp of the deep structure when acting on the surface.
Future research needs to examine how far some pragmatic
frames are more appropriate and efficient for training than
others: In what way might their structure be more transparent
than the structure of other frames? In a study with 14- to
18-month-olds, Rohlfing et al. (2015) found that specific types
of pragmatic frame such as labeling and questioning routines
occurred in the context of joint book reading. Importantly,
both frames fostered the child’s participation in an interaction
involving pointing and later answering questions and were
related to children’s later vocabulary. Although also observable
in other contexts such as free play, the context of joint
book reading seems to richly elicit specific kinds of frames
(Gelman et al., 2005; Rohlfing et al., 2015). We need to
understand more about deep syntax in the sense of the
cognitive operations that give rise to subsequent sequences of
actions.
Individual Differences
Because pragmatic frames comprise a link between
communicative and cognitive skills, individual differences
might emerge in these skills (Akhtar and Gernsbacher, 2007)
and in what individual exposure a child needs to learn a frame:
some children may establish some kind of structure after only a
few exposures, whereas others will need more repetitions to take
advantage of the frame (Rohlfing et al., submitted). The literature
reveals other examples of the bandwidth of important aspects
when learning frames. One essential aspect has been reported by
Bedford et al. (2013), who gave word-learning tasks to 2-year-old
toddlers at high and low risk for autism spectrum disorders.
One group of children received social feedback confirming their
choice; the other group received no feedback. Results showed
that children with a low risk for ASD benefited from feedback
on their initial choice, and that their further performance was
above chance level. In contrast, those with a high risk for ASD
did not show this effect. Because their pragmatic competencies
are commonly viewed as being impaired, it is possible that they
have difficulties in (1) recognizing a sequence of actions as a
whole/frame or (2) prioritizing information within the single
elements of a frame (giving higher priority to the confirmation
rather than to own choice). Future research should investigate
how individuals may differ in picking up a structure and learning
from it.
HOW CURRENT APPROACHES
INTERFACE WITH PRAGMATIC FRAMES
Even though many current approaches interface with the
idea of pragmatic frames, most of them consider the brief
moment of learning but not the history of interaction. As a
consequence, these approaches explain only some surface aspects
of learning and do not account for the communicative foundation
underlying language acquisition. In the following, we examine
how some existing perspectives on language learning interface
with our approach. This allows us to provide further details on
pragmatic frames and contrast them with existing concepts.
Social Cues
Whereas many recent studies advertise the role of social cues
in the process of mapping a word onto its referent (Horst and
Samuelson, 2008; Axelsson et al., 2012), strong criticism of the
mapping metaphor can be found at the core of social-pragmatic
approaches (Nelson, 2007). Tomasello (2001) explicitly suggests
dropping the mapping metaphor in favor of a referential area. He
attributes the learning process not to two independent entities,
namely, the word and its referent, but to a child who is analyzing
the whole situation in terms of a joint action goal. This situation
analysis focuses on a person using a symbol to manipulate the
other’s attention.
Despite cogent reasons for regarding the continuation of
actions rather than just a moment as contributing to language
acquisition, we think that this latter focus has its own justification,
because adults can shape their vocal and non-verbal actions
into “categorical units of cultural communication” (Fogel, 1993,
p. 29). For an adult, a particular element, such as an eye
gaze, a word, or a vocalization with a particular prosody bears
a potential meaning. Thus, it is likely that when learning
language, children progress from utilizing larger behavioral
units to short sequences/cues in order to ascribe meaning in
communication. This idea is supported by studies showing
that children can already recognize single elements (previously
seen within a sequence of actions) and interpret them in
accordance with their experience. One remarkable example is
Senju and Csibra’s (2008) study revealing that 6-month-old
infants can already interpret eye gaze as a cue signaling a
reference to objects. Children probably become educated to
such cues (Nomikou et al., 2013) and can take advantage
of them in later learning processes. This advantage has been
demonstrated convincingly in Horst and Samuelson’s (2008)
study showing how social cues in the form of an ostensive
labeling can influence children’s learning performance. Children
at the age of 24 months were presented with novel objects
in either an ostensive (addressed and being gazed directly
when labeling an object) or a follow-in naming condition
(the object was labeled while the child was manipulating
it). After 5 min delay, they could remember new labels
presented in the ostensive but not in the follow-in naming
condition. We argue that this ostensive condition takes advantage
of a labeling frame that seems to trigger some specific
cognitive operations in children (long-term remembering).
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However, the authors themselves interpreted their findings in
terms of situational cues guiding the child’s attention and
memory.
The literature on cognitive and language development reveals
a consensus that in natural settings, children aged about
18 months can robustly figure out an intended referent on
the basis of joint attention (and some cues) even when some
noise is interfering with the situation (Baldwin, 1993; Carpenter
et al., 1998). What is controversial, however, is the role of
social information before the age of 18 months, and at which
age children become sensitive to the social information that is
considered to be a means of attaining joint attention in the form
of eye contact, gesture, and language.
Pruden et al. (2006) tested which information – social or
perceptual – 10-month-old children would apply to associate
a word with an object. Whereas perceptual information was
operationalized as the salient appearance of the object, the
direction of eye gaze stood for the social information. The authors
found that at the age of 10 months, infants regard the salience
of objects rather than the eye gaze, and they concluded that
perceptual but not social cues are weighted more heavily at this
age. Applying Pruden et al.’s (2006) findings in an emergentist
coalition model (Hirsh-Pasek and Golinkoff, 1996; Hollich et al.,
2000; Golinkoff and Hirsh-Pasek, 2006, 2008) encompassing
different sources of knowledge in the process of reference
resolution, indicates that when it comes to word learning,
social perception as a skill is acquired later in development
(see also Booth et al., 2008). For younger children, general
learning factors such as the sensitivity to perceptual salience
seem to be more important. We think that the critique of
social cues is justified if individual cues are expected to control
attention and memory. However, cues do not occur in isolation in
natural interactions, but embedded in a sequence of actions and
together with other cues. This provides a rich environment, and
attention and memory processes take advantage of the unfolding
situation—and do not just start at the moment when the word is
uttered.
Flom et al. (2004) have shown cogently that when cues
were presented to in 9-month-olds in combinations (which is
the case in natural settings), the frequency of gaze following
toward peripheral targets increased. Hence, it is likely that
additional cue alongside or preceding the eye gaze presented
by Pruden et al. (2006) would have guided the children’s
attention to the referent more reliably than a single cue.
Clearly, different timescales have to be taken into consideration
(Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi, 2015): the immediately preceding context
and the interaction experience that the child brings into
the situation. Concerning the immediate context, Liszkowski
(2014) recently highlighted the importance of preceding action
contexts as a source of symbolic development. More specifically,
he reported findings revealing that in 12- to 14-month-
old children, the outcome of the reference process differs
depending on what the agent has done or seen before (see
also Moll et al., 2006). Thus, joint actions are crucial and
establish a context/history of interaction against which young
children already interpret or use the communicative means.
Whereas Liszkowski (2014) discerns the immediately preceding
action contexts as an ingredient of meaningful behavior in
young children starting to communicate, he barely considers
the conventionalization process (Clark, 1993; see Pragmatic
Frames—an Introduction and History). Waxman and Gelman
(2009, p. 261) made the critical point that associationist
approaches disregard “the fact that each word participates
in an exquisitely detailed linguistic, social, and symbolic
system.” It is not just the association that is formed in the
learning process. Instead, children learn to apply particular
cognitive operations (some cognitive and communicative jobs)
in coordination with their partner. In other words, social cues
are not only a part of the immediate context but also a part
of the physical events that the child has already experienced
with another person in the past. They are, therefore, parts of
events with a specific interaction history (Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi,
2015, p. 7).
Indeed, studies with young infants show convincingly that
language as a signal possesses a unique power from early on:
Words, and not just tones, induce categorization processes in
infants as young as 3 months of age (Ferry et al., 2010). It
is reasonable to think that the link between speech and the
fundamental cognitive process of categorization might well be
part of an innate endowment. However, recent research suggests
that the link might be based rather on the communicative
patterns – what we referred to above as communicative
foundation – that the children have already experienced: In a
recent study by Ferguson and Waxman (2016), 6-month-old
infants were presented with videos containing interactions
between persons who used ‘beeps’ to communicate with each
other in a contingent way. After this exposure, infants were
then tested on whether these beeps facilitated the categorization
of objects. The authors found that 6-month-olds can apply an
otherwise non-communicative signal to categorize objects if they
experience this signal in a cooperative, turn-taking setting. We
think that these findings taken together support our argument
that a communicative foundation is necessary to then give
rise to communicative means that are connected to cognitive
operations.
Dynamic Coupling
With respect to the different timescales that give rise to
meaningful behavior in communication, current pragmatic
theories (Schumacher, 2014) suggest that a phase architecture
drives a communicating system. Whereas in the first phase,
as suggested above, the system is supplied with cues that help
to generate expectations for upcoming words and actions, in
a second phase, a representation can be updated by dynamic
coupling known also as alignment. Beyond developmental
research (see Stephens and Matthews, 2014, for a brief review),
the process of alignment between interactants is known in
studies with adults (Pickering and Garrod, 2004, 2013; De
Jaegher et al., 2010). According to the interactive alignment
account, the automatic process of alignment is observable in
the verbal (Garrod and Anderson, 1987), gestural, and non-
verbal (Kimbara, 2006; Bergmann and Kopp, 2012) behavior of
interactants and results in aligned linguistic representations. For
language acquisition, this perspective implies that interaction
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should not be investigated as a “mere context” in which learning
takes place; instead, interaction should be seen as a part of
the cognitive processes (Nomikou, 2014, pp. 43–44) allowing
individuals to coordinate their cognitive operations to achieve
a joint goal. Investigating learning within interactions means
modifying the idea of how individual cognitive mechanisms work
(Nomikou, 2014). Hsu and Fogel (2003) propose considering
mother–infant dyads as a whole rather than separating them
into individual participants. In fact, this unique coupling of the
caregiver with the learner gives rise to observable phenomena
in child-directed behavior: Visible as caregivers’ child-directed
behavior, these modifications have been observed in speech
(Fernald and Mazzie, 1991; Dominey and Dodane, 2004),
gesture (Iverson et al., 1999; Grimminger et al., 2010), and
motion (Brand et al., 2002; Rohlfing et al., 2006; Wrede et al.,
2013). Their function has been appraised across disciplines as
facilitating children’s recognition of the structure in language
and action. The first approaches toward a social feedback
loop are now being formulated (Fukuyama et al., 2014; Pitsch
et al., 2014; Warlaumont et al., 2014). However, further
theoretical developments need to acknowledge that caregivers’
responsiveness is not restricted to particular cultural patterns
such as joint attention but rests upon joint action— as already
anticipated by Shotter and Newson (1982).
The Importance of Statistical Learning
and an Accumulating Linguistic
Knowledge Base
In Section “Pragmatic Frames Require a History of an
Interaction,” we emphasized that pragmatic frames allow us
to capture different time scales. The value of information
accumulating within and across situations has been recognized by
some authors who propose that children do not need a conceptual
representation to map a word onto its referent in specific
situations. First, grounded in the sense of novelty, an association
can be established by the child’s perception of a novel object that
will stand out because it is unfamiliar (Mather and Plunkett,
2012). Second, children benefit from their memories across
situations, and they notice which elements remain constant
across multiple uses of a word and thereby ascribe a meaning
to it (Akhtar and Montague, 1999; see Smith and Yu, 2008; Yu
and Smith, 2012, for computational models on cross-situational
learning). The ability to compare across situations is in line
with Bruner (1983) who emphasizes that children’s sensitivity to
invariant aspects of a situation might be a part of their cognitive
endowment. Even though children’s ability to compare across
situations is viewed as crucial, there are only very few models
that try to explain how children integrate these experiences with
online information. Although McMurray et al. (2012) provide a
model that uses two timescales, this is restricted to the one frame
of learning the meanings of novel words.
Certainly, more flexible models are needed that can account
for the integration of timescales without being limited to one task.
In addition, models need to account for the fact that children
seem to differ with respect to their ability to recognize invariant
aspects of a situation. One excellent example of this individual
difference is the shape bias. Jones and Smith (1993, p. 132)
argued that shape bias emerges as “the child learns to represent
the regularities that exist between how words are used, the
co-occurrence of properties in objects, and the act of attending to
particular properties.” Interestingly, children who are at risk for
delay in language acquisition, so-called late talkers, seem to gain
a different operation from their word-learning experience than
their age-mates and lack “a potentially helpful shape bias” (Jones,
2003, p. 482).
Studying disadvantaged populations provides an important
way for further research to recognize which experience results in
which cognitive dispositions while taking individual differences
into account. In the case of late-talking children, we think that
the cognitive operation of attending to a shape is a product of
a labeling frame. Children who do not develop this shape bias
might need more exposure to a particular frame in order to
discern their “jobs,” and thus their role (Heller and Rohlfing,
in preparation). In a recent study, we showed that 3-year-old
children diagnosed with language impairment benefited from
repetitions of the context (Rohlfing et al., submitted). Further
research should focus on children’s individual differences in
applying other biases or principles in language acquisition such
as the whole-object assumption (Markman and Wachtel, 1988) or
mutual exclusivity (Carey and Bartlett, 1978). These differences
might well be explained by children’s individual experiences with
particular pragmatic frames and their individual need for a more
frequent or dense occurrence of such frames.
A further question is whether pragmatic frames are relevant
only for young children. We think that this is not the case. For
older children and adults, Quasthoff (1997, p. 59) has applied the
term “discourse unit” instead of pragmatic frame to refer to verbal
behaviors performed with a specific purpose such as instructing
on how to play a game, discussing, narrating a story or telling a
joke in a conversation. Those behaviors exhibit a global structure
that establishes sequential conditions, “not only for a single next
turn but for an ordered series of next turns” (p. 58). Children
and adults need to learn the global structure if they are to act
appropriately (see Table 1).
Even though we argue that pragmatic frames are operative
in later language competence (i.e., in older children as well as
adults), we agree that once children possess a communicative
foundation in the form of a repertoire of pragmatic frames, they
can use language within them in a more elaborated way. For
example, Nelson (1974, p. 277) suggests a “functional synthesis” is
achieved once the child experiences various relations (pragmatic
frames) in which a specific word is involved. Clearly, it is
necessary to further specify the way language skills unfold within
pragmatic frames (see Lieven et al., 2003, for examples) and with
growing knowledge about their variety. This is not the focus here.
Nonetheless, children are helped by their accumulating linguistic
knowledge base, and they can also establish the association
through their linguistic experience (Gershkoff-Stowe, 2002): The
more words children already know, the more they can benefit
from phonological and semantic memories of non-targets that
spread inhibitory activation. Gershkoff-Stowe (2002, p. 665)
reported that as children practice producing individual words,
“those words become stronger and more resistant to interference
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from lexical competitors.” Thus, knowledge that is distinct to
the target word minimizes word retrieval error (Capone and
McGregor, 2005, p. 1469; see also Goodman et al., 1998). In line
with this claim, Gershkoff-Stowe and Hahn (2007) investigated
the role of practice by training 16- to 18-month-old children
to comprehend and produce nouns across several sessions.
Some words were trained in 12 (high-practice sets), some in
3 (medium), and some in only 1 session (low-practice sets).
Compared to a control group that learned to label familiar
objects, children in the experimental group not only improved
their knowledge about words from high-practice sets but also
demonstrated better performance in identifying low-practice
words from the previous session. The authors concluded:
The more an item is selected for comprehension or production,
the stronger the level of activation will be and, hence, the greater
the probability of access. This idea suggests that practice with
individual words in a rapidly expanding lexicon changes the
operation of the lexicon through the accumulated activation of
many items (p. 691).
Similarly, Thom and Sandhofer (2009) investigated the ability
of 20-month-old children to extend new color words to new
instances when trained with two, four, or six different color
words. They found that the more broadly children learned (and
the more instances they were exposed to during training), the
more they were able to extend the acquired words. Thus, the
“vocabulary size within a domain was related to subsequent word
learning within that same domain” (Thom and Sandhofer, 2009,
p. 471).
Experience that lets children bind words with their referents
can lay “the ground work in infancy for more rapid (and perhaps
more hypothesis-testing-like) processes in later word learning”
(Smith and Yu, 2008, p. 1566). The idea here is that concepts
are not isolated entities but part of semantic networks (cf. Keil
and Batterman, 1984) and interactive activities. Thus, a child with
extensive knowledge accretion about adjectives who is learning
a new adjective for some entity is in a very different position
from a child learning the same new word who has little or no
knowledge of the members of that category (Keil and Batterman,
1984, p. 232; Thom and Sandhofer, 2009).
From our perspective, these examples indicate an experience
not only with a particular word class but – more importantly –
with its learning frame.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS
We think that the concept of “pragmatic frame” helps us to
understand the co-development of cognitive and communicative
dispositions in children. It provides research on language
acquisition with an alternative framework to the widely assumed
mapping process by offering a complex context of actions and
goals that enfolds at different time scales and needs to be
negotiated between interactants. As outlined above, we think
that our extended notion of pragmatic frames goes beyond
the frameworks currently offered. Although our concept relates
strongly to Bruner’s definition, we extend it by (1) clearly
differentiating between the meaning and the syntax of a
pragmatic frame and (2) identifying the cognitive layer. Central to
our view is the assumption that pragmatic frames are not limited
to the agent’s own actions, but involve pragmatic aspects of an
ongoing situation organized around an interactional goal.
Can pragmatic frames be conceived as speech acts? As already
noted above, pointing to an object and labeling it can be seen as
a speech act, and Bruner (1983, p. 133) points to the possibility
that “eventually, formats provide the basis for speech acts and
their constraining felicity conditions. We learn how to invoke
them by speech.” Speech act theories focus on particular linguistic
constructions occurring in different pragmatic contexts. For
example, the indication “it is sweet” when referring to a new
candy bar can be interpreted as either a description or a warning.
Which illocutionary force it has will be determined by the
preceding context of the indication. Austin (1962) differentiates
further between the illocutionary act (which is intended by the
speaker) and the perlocutionary act (the effect of an act). In our
approach, the illocutionary and perlocutionary force are present
not only in the surface meaning – because this enables individuals
to act and react – but also in the deep meaning – because this is
formed by the underlying deep syntax. From the developmental
perspective, we second Bruner (1983) and view speech acts as
patterns of verbal behavior that can eventually be used explicitly.
However, we are convinced that the pragmatic frame is a more
basic structure underlying speech acts.
Communication practice is another concept that is less well-
known in cognitive science but stems from research exploiting
communication within Conversation Analysis. In linguistic
research, communicative practices refer to co-constructed
acts of “linguistic habitus” (Hanks, 1987, p. 668). Hanks
(1987) emphasizes the cultural dependencies of such discourse
practices/genres, characterizing them as “elements of linguistic
habitus, consisting of stylistic, thematic, and indexical schemata
on which actors improvise in the course of linguistic production”
(Hanks, 1987, p. 668). This line of research focuses on the co-
constructive effort involved in these practices, and as a method
specifies the tasks as well as roles that individuals are fulfilling in
a sequence (see, e.g., Forrester, 2013; Rossmanith et al., 2014).
Because pragmatic frames consist of a sequence of actions,
they resemble the concept of scripts (Schank and Abelson,
1977). Two other related aspects are (1) the hierarchy, because
scripts are described as being nested in each other (a feature we
mentioned in Section “Hierarchy of Pragmatic Frames”) and (2)
the presence of slots. However, to the best of our knowledge, the
concept of scripts does not differentiate between the syntax and
the meaning. Instead, the focus lies on the surface structure and
captures the sequentiality of an event in a particular context.
To summarize the similarities and differences, we think that
current approaches to semantics highlight the role of form-
meaning pairings when attempting to specify which factors of
the context shape the meaning. In, contrast, our approach takes
a broader perspective (in time and locus) on the interaction
as a source for semantics. We argue that the communicative
foundation is necessary for children to learn language. We view
it as emerging from (1) the routines that have become established
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(consisting of a particular syntax) in order to accomplish (2)
a goal (i.e., the meaning) by means of (3) joint contributions
split into the participants’ roles in these routines. This behavior
evokes (4) cognitive dispositions. As a result, cognitive factors
are embedded in the child’s social experience (Nelson, 2007,
p. 45), and meaning is distributed among participants (Shotter
and Newson, 1982) and among the different time scales (e.g.,
Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi et al., 2014) encompassing memories of
established routines.
For further research we propose the following hypotheses and
claims:
– Individual differences in experiencing pragmatic frames (their
quantity and variety) will be reflected in children’s later
language skills as interactions guide them toward creating new
slots or recognizing elements of frames that enable them to
differentiate between known and new sequences.
– Without knowing the frame, a child’s understanding of
language will be impaired.
– Learning a new frame (and thus new verbal behavior) involves
a close coupling between tutor and learner. This coupling
might thus be crucial for the overall success of learning.
– Children make sense of new frames by assembling known
elements of the deep and surface structure.
Importantly, the concept of pragmatic frames has
methodological implications. Pragmatic frames emphasize the
fact that a word is not learned in a binary fashion but that the
understanding of a concept and its linguistic representation
emerges gradually and can be measured at different levels
(Nomikou et al., 2016, accepted). As stated above, we define
pragmatic frames as consisting of processes at the cognitive
and pragmatic level (Figure 1). Accordingly, learning can be
measured at those levels. More specifically,
– The development of the understanding of a new word can
be measured through related cognitive functions. Visual
attention within a pragmatic frame can indicate whether,
for example, the goal of an action has been understood.
Demonstrations of familiarity with certain objects or words
indicate that a first step is being taken toward understanding
the meaning of an object within an action. Motor control,
such as the way in which an object is grasped, can also be an
indicator of a learning process.
– The development of the understanding of communicative
or pragmatic functions within a frame can be measured by
expectations or behavior of the learner: for example, that
feedback is expected by the tutor after demonstrating an
action, and so forth.
By refocusing on the concept of pragmatic frames in this
article, our main aim was to shift attention away from the
learning outcome toward the learning process. Nonetheless, at
the end of this article, we have to admit that some aspects
remain uncovered: These pertain to the process of generalization
and transfer. For example, children’s progressive use of verbal
behavior needs a special focus to achieve a description of the
“progressive liberation of utterances from physical contexts of
co-action” (Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi et al., 2015, p. 15). Empirical
research has to reveal how words become powerful in enriching
a situation. Whereas some work has been done on the
progressively creative use of words (Barrett et al., 1991; Lieven
et al., 2003), little is known about the liberation from physical
contexts of co-action. Another important question is how verbal
knowledge accumulated within frames becomes decontextualized
and transferred from one situation to another. This focus on
the development of cognitive processing can be found in some
theoretical and empirical work (e.g., Nelson, 1974; Barrett et al.,
1991; Rohlfing, 2006). A meta-analysis identifying word learning
scenarios as particular pragmatic frames and comparing their
effects might be a next helpful step toward uncovering the
differences in the flexible use of verbal knowledge.
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